Putin’s Precarious Position

A Blue And White Insight Into The Tentative Power Dynamics Within Russia

D. H. Kang

SINCE PUTIN WAS INSTATED AS PRIME MINISTER IN 1999, he has maintained a high hand over Russia. Alternating between the roles of President or Prime Minister for the 24-year duration from 1999-2023, he has always been surrounded by security service professionals and technocrats, and held an unquestionable authority over the political scene. Any potential opposition to his multi-decade reign has either – in rarer instances – spoken out and been incarcerated like in the case of Alexei Navalny, or more commonly, simply kept quiet, and out of the scene. Well, fair enough. Given Putin’s Soviet-era KGB background, he has several “friends” from St Petersburg who have and continue to watch his back.

Aside from just the sheer amount of armed forces and military that adorn his sceptre of Russia and vouch for his authority as a leader, previously it seemed he had some intrinsic attributes of wisdom that made him a proficient leader. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 from Ukraine demonstrated a trenchant strategic sense – the timing to grasp the relative power vacuum after the Revolution of Dignity required both a decisiveness and a nuanced understanding of the aftermath of such a revolution. During his intervention in the Syrian Civil War that began in 2015, Putin displayed his capability to produce results – the “terrorist” Assad regime’s territorial control recorded its lowest level in the subsequent years (17% in 2017), stemming from tactical air strikes and scorched earth strategy. 

Traditionally, the domestic belief concerning a good Russian leader, always deemed that masculine infallibility was a key quality; hence some of the images that you may have seen of Putin riding shirtless on a horse. And indeed, all his successes established a reputation of semi-invincibility, power and authority for Putin within Russia. That is, until recently. The invasion of Ukraine highlighted his inability to finish what he started, which was embarrassing, especially given the sheer numerical difference in terms of military might between the two nations. To add fuel to the fire, the recent rebellion from the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, Prigozhin, has also begun to erode Putin’s position. 750 kilometres were covered in a single day, and the mercenary group captured a large region surrounding Mariupol, forcing Putin to negotiate with mere mercenaries, something that was previously unthinkable for his supporters.

In the words of Thomas Graham, a former national security adviser on Russia to George W. Bush: “Any Russian leader must be able to do three things to keep the confidence of the elites – protect them from external enemies, protect them from the Russian people and protect them from each other. He’s not performing these tasks well; they’re not doing well against the external enemy of Ukraine. He’s not forcefully resolving things.” 

Putin is worried, especially given the previous case of Mikhail Gorbachev being forcefully displaced by the 1991 Soviet coup d’etat attempt. Although he subsequently remained in power for a few years, the coup had significant repercussions on his image and authority, leading to Gorbachev’s waning influence and dethronement just a few years later. To avoid this fate, it seems Putin is turning to the extremes, and employing every possible such measure to cling onto his seat. Both General Valery Gerasimov, the armed forces chief of staff and General Sergei Surovikin, the deputy commander of Russian forces in Ukraine have not yet been seen since the uprising – a move that seems to make them scapegoats whilst also highlighting the fact that he still has immense political influence over the nation. 

It is to be expected that the attack on Ukraine will increase drastically, both in the bombardment of cities and ground-troop attacks, as Putin’s position and legacy all hinge on the outcome of the war in the upcoming months or even years.