A ‘Peaceful’ Alternative

How and when do sanctions work

M. D. Kwak

IT’S OFTEN EASY to be swept up in the delusional grandeur of Western power or the cries for non-violent diplomatic pressure and believe that negative sanctions are sufficient when they are clearly not. In the international sphere, sanctions are an alternative to armed intervention or war but their success is not always guaranteed.

Targeting a nation’s economy might seem intuitive when attempting to hurt them and force them to give in to pressure – especially in cases for corrupt and wealthy dictatorships or one-party states. However, for some reason, US sanctions didn’t work in Iran, international sanctions continue to prove ineffective in deterring North Korea’s nuclear program and more recently, sanctions on Russian oligarchs and economy have done little to halt Putin’s war campaigns in Ukraine.

In all of these cases, negative sanctions tangibly affected the standard of living in these countries, damaged their economies and successfully provided a sizable economic and social incentive to give in to scrutiny and demands from the West. However, in all cases, sanctions have been widely ineffective. For a more nuanced view of sanctions, one must consider all the circumstances at hand apart from the simplistic and often faulty economic calculus and incentives at play. Just because a country is slightly economically affected doesn’t warrant a change in behaviour. 

That isn’t to say sanctions have a marginal benefit or can’t be very successful – it just takes a certain number of factors. To illustrate a few of the influences at hand that determine whether a sanction is successful or not, one can compare sanctions against South Africa in its Apartheid and current sanctions against North Korea.

In the case of South Africa, the countries sanctioning it were often seen as allies – actors like the USA and Great Britain. Whereas in North Korea, the same nations sanctioning it are explicitly seen as enemies and threats – built up with propaganda and historical narratives. This softens the psychological impact of attempting to isolate these countries – you can’t isolate a hermit state that has probably expected and put up with Western sanctions for years. The same can’t be said for South Africa and that time.

Furthermore, in South Africa there was domestic opposition in the form of Nelson Mandela that could pressure the state internally whilst in North Korea, there is little to none. As much as sanctions are about international pressure, they are very good for empowering domestic actors to force change and use sanctions as way of politically ousting the weakened regime. Private businesses have a lot of autonomy and can do things like capital flight, investment changes and lobbying of government to change policy. Sanctions mean that they are the ones suffering most, and South Africa’s private firms, at the time, did a lot of pressuring. However, in North Korea, the state usually owns all of the enterprise and sanctions end up benefiting them in many cases. Sanctions turn the state into the only source for vital goods like food and oil. Sanctions of Iran made its military very rich as they were the only ones with technology. Sanctions might make the poorest citizens suffer but not the rich state business.

International sanctions on North Korea also end up inflating the ideological narratives of Juche – of self-reliance and isolation from Western intervention. However, a vital differentiator between the success and failure of a sanction is how universal and airtight it is. Sanctions on South Africa were comprehensive and unified which targeted the state’s reliance on the international supply chain for things like oil and flows of credit and assets to do business. However, North Korea has been able to employ backdoors by exporting to African dictatorships or trading with China at its border. This has allowed for its economy to survive – and its oligarchy to continue to repress and spend money on what they want. 

Sanctions can definitely make it harder on a targeted country. In many cases, it’s psychologically damaging and makes it harder for the nation to pay for military and nuclear programs and acquire items for it. It also denies access to key goods and inspires local resistance. Crucially, however, sanctions are by no means, a golden bullet. They can even backfire occasionally and all relevant circumstances need to be manipulated in order for any chance of success and actualisation of change.